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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION POLICY DEVEWPMENT
WITHIN EUROPE, JAPAN AND TilE UNITED STATES
Several important common traits are identifiable among nations surveyed with existing
or newly proposed high speed rail (HSR) or maglev systems:
o

In each nation a close and cooperative government-industry pannership exists to
achieve the goals of HSR/maglev development and deployment. These models of
teamwork are instrumental to system development and implementation success.

o

At the close of World War II (WW!l) a number of developed nations rebuilt and
modernized transportation (and other) infrastructure.

o

Large scale reinvestment in transportation infrastructure was deemed essential to
domestic economic growth and well-being, and financed as a public investment.

o

The rail systems evolved into powerful national public entities and provided a vital
public service - public transportation.

o

In Europe, historically, the national tail systems were the principal means of moving
large volumes of troops and equipment in two recent world wars. These systems
were viewed, therefore, as national defense systems. Further investments to upgrade
these systems were viewed as integral to the national defense interests of each nation.
By contrast, in post WWU years in the U.S .. major transportation emphasis was on
investments in the multi- billion dollar National Defense Highway system.

o

A clear circular trend is evident when comparing the evolution of rail public policy in
the U.S to other nations. Each point in this circle begets the next and so on until the
last point again begets the first point. The points include :
I.

Substantial levels of public investments result in high levels and quality of
public transportation and HSR service levels.

2.

Substantial levels of service and quality (and competitive fares) beget high
levels of public usage and modal share;

3.

High levels of ridership (as a percent of the total population) generate large
public support for public investments in these transportation investments.

4.

Public support for the systems investments generate high per capita tax levels
and public investment for public transit and intercity HSR.

I

o

Since the end of WWII these nations (along with the U.S.) all experienced a
considerable growth in demand for automobile travel.

o

While per capita auto ownership in these countries was historically only a fraction
(50% to 75%) of U.S. levels. These differences in auto ownership levels are
decreasing each year. Autos per capita increased by 120% and !03% in Germany
and France respectively over the 1965-82 time frame, while only increasing 37% over
that period in the U.S.

o

In each country substantial growth in the airlines industry (also largely publicly
owned) was also being felt.

o

In each country (including the United States) rail transportation planners were
realizing the rapid erosion of intermediate distance travel markets to the automobile,
and longer distance travel markets to the air mode.

o

Each country with a mature HSR system (Japan, France and Germany and to a lesser
extent the other European and Asian Rim nations) realized that HSR service would
provide a much more competitive new travel alternative to the air and auto mode
helping to stem the large scale rail ridership erosion being experienced world wide.
In the United States, this rationalization of transportation reality never materialized , as
the dominance of the "new" air and auto modes were allowed full expression with no
consideration of "new" rail.

o

In th.e U.S. as elsewhere, the automobile is subsidized. In the United States,
however, th.e subsidiary is considerably higher than in Europe and Japan.
Increasingly in other nations, an environmental and other externality fee is attached to
the automobile mode to more equalize the subsidies between modes.

o

In each. case the National Interregional Rail system (and transit) receives both
operating and capital subsidies ranging from 29% to almost 70% of total combined
expense. Public transit is similarly subsidized there and here.

o

These public rail subsidies (and relatively low regulated fares) resulted in
accumulation of substantial National Rail system debt for the nations examined. In
each case (Japan, France, and Germany), by general agreement, the federal public
sector is assuming responsibility for the vast majority of that debt.

[Jigh Speed Rail iliSRl System D~velopments

In Japan, France, Germany (and elsewhere in Europe) a HSR system was developed
>n top of an already highly-matured conventional rail system. As a result, much of the
idersbip on the consioe[l!ply incre;~sed HSR smice routes is diverted from the substantial
•ase of c;Qnventional rail ridership.
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o

In each case, a pan of HSR capi!al construction costs is subsidized. The TGV ParisLyon Southeast system • may• be an exception to this finding, but all accounts are not
clear. Specific financing details are not available, but the evidence provided to date
by SNCF suggests the TGV system does pay for all operating costs and a
considerable amount of debt interest and (apparently) purchase and lease fees for
rolling stock and initial HSR line construction debt and interest. In the case of the
TGV Atlantic the federal grant subsidy was precisely 30% of capital costs (or
approximately $600 million 1991 dollars).

o

In each case where HSR is put into revenue service these systems £Ontribyte
positively (or deter debt growth) to the national rail system's revenue earnings and
throw off a surplus system profit. The financial profit to SNCF for the TGV ParisLyon system is 15% of total revenues, while the intermediate speed IC service
generates a 9% surplus profit (over expenses) for the Germany National Railway. A
similar (but not reported) positive return is generated by the Shinkansen in Japan, the
U.S. Amtrak Metroliner service and (presumably) other HSR services across the
world. These "profits" help sustain unprofitable conventional rail services elsewhere
across the system and lower overall system accumulated debt.

o

Financing of HSR systems have at least two principal revenue stream philosophies.
The first is represented by the French TGV approach of exclusively focusing on a
"light" HSR system that transports passengers and light packages only. The
alternative is represented by the "heavy" HSR approach of building a system to
commercially carry both passeneers and ~ieht. The potential increases in revenue
earnings must be balanced off against considerably higher (as much as double from
$16 to $32 million a mile) HSR system capital infrastructure costs and potentially
higher O&M costs. The latter is not yet clearly established.

o

The Europeans have established an important method to financing expensive new HSR
rolling stock in at the lowest possible costs. They established a publicly held multinational rail financing corporation. The 16 European (governmental owned) railway
systems created Eurofima, a joint stock company under Swiss law for financing
rolling stock, with an established triple A credit rating. The company can purchase
vehicles in large series from international tender and provide advantageous funding
for purchase or lease of these investments to member railway systems. The aggregate
value of equipment fmanced from 1956 10 1989 is approximately 25.7 billion Swiss
francs.

o

A number of specific references are made to limited and even substantial real estate
related gains associated with rail systems developments across the world. For
example JNR, (much like early U.S. rail expansions) initially developed considerable
real estate assets as a basis for generating revenue and ridership in its early years.
Also, currently in Japan real estate revenues do retain an imponant part in private
sector railroad systems balance sheets. In the U.S., Amtrak real estate revenues
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exceeded $25 million annually in late 1980's, and Amtrak continues to attempt to
increase those earnings. In Canada, France (Paris and Lyon), Germany, Sweden (and
elsewhere) real estate development proceeds at and near station locations are valuable
rail system attributeS. However, real estate returns are not anywhere reponed as a
sienificant percent or wni.on of the system's r~v~nue ~eneration strej\IJJ for
specifically financing the HSR services in these countries.
o

Despite current extent of HSR systems deployment in each nation conventional rail
service continues to loose ridership. Auto and air modes continue to increase and
dominate many segments of growing travel demand. 6~aio, rail planners in these
nations recognize in order to funher stem the tide of continual erosion, increased
investments in HSR!magtev public transportation systems will be warranted in the
future.

Dj[ferences Between European-Japanese a nd U.S. Public Transportation-HSR Pub!i~

I!QUcies.
Distinctly different and specifically focused public policies have evolved in the
European-Japanese nations (relative to the United States) in support of the high speed (and
ot.her) rail modes. These include (but are not limited to):
o

The Japanese and European model of close Government-private comoration
partnership and cooperation is one of the primazy roots of sustained HSR and Maglev
research achievements and de.ployment successes. This teamwork in turn more easily
begets public support.

o

In each country the major successes of HSR and Maglev research and development
has been under written by public funds with substantial private industry research
involvement.

o

Very powerful public agencies own and operate the national public rail systems.
(Japan recently moved to privatize JNR, but '!las totally public until 1988.)

o

The cost of automobile use is considerably higher in Europe and Japan. This is true
despite the fact that the U.S. auto fleet consumes more energy on average than any
other nation examined.

o

These higher automobile ownership and operation costs are mostly attributable to
consciously applied public policies in each country with much higher fuel and vehicle
purchase tax levels.

o

Second, each HSR nation has an explicit policy of high motor oil (diesel and gasoline)
taxes. The cost of the gasoline tax in every nation surveyed (except the U.S. and
Canada) exceeds the cost of the fuel itself by a considerable amount. In Italy and
4

Denmark, as an example, the cost of ~asoline tax exceeds the cost of the easoline b~
285% and 355%. respectiveb:, while the tax is only 25% of tb.e fuel cost in Ihe U.S.
in 1991. 1
o

Gasoline prices in the U,S, in real terms, are les~ exp_ensjve today tban at an~ time
since the end of WWIJ. This is attributable to the sustained low tax rate (in real
terms) in the U.S. The spending value of federal and local gasoline taxes severely
eroded up through the 1990's to be only a fraction of its value over the 1950-1970
time period. This under-priced value of the petroleum resource accelerates wasteful
over consumptive use of the resource in the U.S., and detracts from the attractiveness
of the public modes.

o

Sales tax prices on new U.S . automobiles is only 5% of a new car price while it is
14% in Germany, 33% in France, and 40% to 50% in much of the rest of Europe
and 186% of purchase price in Denmark.

o

Average annual taxation of a standard car in the U. S. (1982$) is only $119 while in
Europe the average tax varies from $450 to $825.

o

Land use policies in Europe and Canada either explicitly prohibit sprawled suburban
development or strongly encourage high-density cluster development, while in the
U.S. sprawl urbanization is systematically encouraged at all levels of government
implicitly and explicitly .

o

Japanese, French and German governments have the ability to set public policy
procedures restricting commercial transportation systems competition with HSR
modes. Japanese, French and German airlines are predominantly governmentally
owned and all charge air fares considerably higher than U. S carriers (over similar
route miles) and the domestic HSR system fares.

The German government can dictate policy that will direct the HSR/air modes to be
complimentary and not competitive to their respective economic death. For example:
In Frankfurt (and elsewhere) the· imernational airport was developed to
facili~~ inter- and intra-regional rail travel by providing djr«t access, in th~
airport, to both inter-regional HSR service and local light urban rail service.
The German government encouraged its national airline, Lufthansa, to invest
and own the interregional rail business shuttling passengers between airpons
on the Lufthansa shuttle express rail system.

l !"ul>lic-Tn.o.!pC!rtllioo Filwtc!:\c Wid Sul»idi(l bx M2d£ iz, \bf tJMtc.d Sul:-J,A rq»n t0 the- Hi&:b Spud lWI At)«itlioo Conlcte'f'lct , l..yt~,b, T . •
Florida St.a1e U4ivenily, M-y 7. l991
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The federal Gennan government has instituted a national uansportation policy
that no domestic commercial airline Oiellts will operate within the national
boundaries of Germany by 1995. All jntcmal travel will be on auto. sur{ace
HSR or other carriers .
The federal govern ments, as in the case of France, can effectively regulate
national airline fares and thereby keep unwarranted price wars and
uncornpetitive market gouging from going on within cenain corridors.
While the ability to regulate fares can be an asset, it can also operate as a
constraint in differing settings. This ability can facilitate maintaining low HSR
fares (as they are in France, Japan and Germany and all other cases
examined - especially relative to the air mode) and this can greatly facilitate
increasing travel and access to these markets to a wide spectrum of society.
This ability to regulate fares can also tend to facilitate building of broad social
support for the systems.
The constraining nature of this governmental prerogative can also be very
debilitating to a system as it was in Japan. If rates are artificially maintained
at too low a level for too long, insufficient revenue is generated and general
debt becomes substantially bloated . The general traveling public becomes
accustomed to very inexpensive travel costs (as the U.S. is with the price of
gasoline) and resistant to any measurable increase in travel costs. Very low
(governmentally regulated) JNR rail fares, resulted in the national railway
accumulating a very large debt. This, in tum, resulted in inevitable fare
adjustments in the mid-1980's which resulted in a brief general strike on the
part of consumers and eventual governmental assumption of the huge debt and
the dismembermen t of the JNR national railways itself.
o

The European nations examined evaluate the financial and socioeconomic feasibility oi
development of alternative HSR corridor developments in their analysis. Given that
the accepted public purpose of these nationally owned HSR systems is to deliver
transportation and other social and economic services (jobs, e.fficient economic growth
and so forth), these public sector returns are calculated into the corridor feasibility
evaluation. For example, while the TGY Southeast estimates a 15% financial Internal
Rate of Return (IRR) for the French National Railroad system , planners also estimate
a 30% socioeconomic IRR for that alignment. Similarly. the financial and economic
returns for the TGY Atlantic are 12% and 23%, IRR respectively.

o

The Community of European Railways estimated that as much as $120 billion
investment in 5,600 miles of very high (155-200 mph) rail corridor, and 9,200 miles
of intermediate speed (up to 130 mph) HSR service will be developed by 2010. They
have estimated that this European HSR network will yield the following immediate
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and longer run economic and financial returns to the rail companies and economic and
socio-economic returns to the localities.

European Hieh Speed Rail Network Financial Economic Viabilit}!'

Financial Investments Internal Rate of Return
Network Service

VI (1995)
V2 (2005)
V3 (2015)

Source: European Rail Community
10 Years after
At Date of
Entry Into
Entry Into
Service
Service
9.4% in 1995
13.3% in 2005
14.1% in 2015
9.8% in 2005
15.5% in 2025
10.8% in 2015

European High Speed Rail Network
Financial and Socioeconomic Inlernru Rate of Return'
Network Service

VI (1995)
V2 (2005)
V3 (2015)

At Date of
Entry Into
Service
17.7% in 1995
19.3% in 2005
20.1% in 2015

2

10 Years after
Entry Into
Service
24 .1 % in 2005
26.4% in 2015
28. 1% in 20254

Cktatdi:D. 8 .. ·r&aadrc tbc- Er.lrt'lptCI fiiab Speed Ttala NawOI't, • PllMio& llloCI Tr&!!:!p9tt gm ..arch and Came...._OOn. Vol. P'l20. J9l9.pp.
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IMPLICATIONS FQRIMI?T..EMENTATION AND FINANCING

OF HSRIMAGLEV ELSLOWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES .
This review of HSR and other public transportation systems financing in Europe and
Japan offer some clear implications for financing HSR systems in Florida. These include:
FINANCE

o

Initial public support for HSR capital costs (for right-of-way, rail line construction,
land purchase and so fonh) is essential, to some extent, on virtually every proposed
alignment.

o

Levels of public support for infrastructure will vary considerably between different
urban corridors

o

State and Federal (or a public/private cooperative venture offering) low interest loans
for additional capital sru! rolling stock purchases are essential to maintain a HSR
positive cash flow.

o

High quality and competitively priced HSR service will command substantial and
loyal ridership base. This ridership base may, however, require a number of years to
mature.

o

Ridership revenues will, at a minimum, pay all operation costs and typically be able
to offer some repayment of capital debt needs. This capability will expand with the
maturing of the ridership base given the lack of substantial existing rail use.

o

Evaluation of possible HSR freight markets within corridors should be examined.

o

Direct real estate revenues from joint or individual developments can offer attractive
returns but these prospectS are typically localized to the station area (within a mile),
or physically linked to the rail system. These revenues can most effectively be
captured with development planned and executed in the earliest stages of rail system
development and only be effective with local government cooperation .

o

Capture of rail induced property value land appreciations near the rail alignment can
be accomplished through special assessment districts. These revenues can most
effectively be captured with local government cooperation.

o

Rail fares should offer travel cost incentives below conventional air services.

o

HSR corridor evaluations should comprehensively include socio-economic and
environmental benefits and fairly compare system economic returns to the alternative
modes.

8

rUBLIC POLICY
>

The first adjenda is to design and implement a powerful and new American model Qf
government/private sector cooperative Rartnership. This team must !>e forged
immediately with a common purpose to research. build and deploy HSR and Maglev
systems within the Unjted Slat~.

>

The common mission of this new joint public/private partnership must be to deliver
one service - high quality and efficient public transportation.

>

The financial base of this new relationship should be joint public/private with
dominant funding from public sources and private sector initiatives functioning to
develop patients and properly capitalize on implementation and operation aspects.
Coordinated Federal, state and local government public policy and environmental
reviews must operate to facilitate HSR system ridership growth.

HSR systems must be efficiently integrated with airports, public mass transit systems,
conventional rail systems, and automobile modes. These complimentary multi-modal
linkages are central to success or failure of HSR ridership growth.
Extensive expansion of competitive inter-urban transportation networks should be
discouraged. For example, HSR airport linkages (and associated costs) should be
explored instead of expansion of regional airports capacity. Continued highway
capacity expansion should be halted in corridors competitive with deployed HSR
services.

Compatible land use and comprehensive plan designations adjoining the HSR
alignment and stations must be ensured.
A broad based public policy evaluation, and public education and communication
program should accompany HSR system development. This program should explore
the public services delivered by the HSR system and generate conclusions of that
research to ensure public support.
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•

Fo~liu.d~

South Florida Water Management
Diltrict to auesa the eoata and
benefit& of the Everglade. compr&henaive restoration and protection
plan.

.

Dr. Tim Lynch, Dirutor
The Cenur for Economie Foreeaating
and Analyaio (CEFAl, loc:a!A!d at Florida
S tab! Univeraity, apeeialiua in tho
conotnu:tion of computer-buod ec~
nomic uattament and forocuting
models. Analyzio ia eonduciA!d in a range
of reeearch areu ineludina envi.ronmen·
tal and transportation econom.ice,
revenue forecasting, fiacal impacts,
compre.henaive planning and bu~ting,
capitol and infrutructuro evaluation,
and real utau and land uae planning.

•

Development ofmodela, and completion of economic and fiacal analyoio
for the Florida Department of
Tranaportation , Offiee ofHJab Speed
Transportation on propooed mac·
netic levitation and high opeed rail
oya!A!ms.

•

Training and development for tho
atoll' of public and privatA! agencies
in the areas ofbenefitleoat and coat/
etTeetivenesa analysia, atatiatical
and computer modeling, and
guidanee on federal and otate
economic impact auessment.
statements.

•

Dr. Lynch currently servu as

The een!A!r provides IA!chnical oupport,
training, and eonaultation in tho areas
of benefit/coat and eoat/efl'ectivenesa
analysia, atatatical and computer model
development, and other areao of •~
nomic anaJysiL

Select projecto and studieo include:
•

Development of a sa lea tu
economic forecasting and impact
model, for assessing the diverse
fiscal and societal implication& of a
proposed one percent local option
sales tax inerease for transit in
Dade eount;y.

•

Evaluation of tranaportatlonrela!A!d btnefito in Dado eounty
from lower fares and u pgraded rail
and bus transit serviees seroaa the
county.

Development of an environmental
economic model, and analywU for the

Visiting Scientist for Argonne
National Laboratory developing
transportation- related environ·
mental assessment models. He is a
member of the U.S. Senate
Magnetic Levitation Technical
Advisory Committee. Recently
appointed, Dr. Lynch also serves on
the National Academy or Science
Federal Magnet.ie Levitation
Development Program Advisory
Board.

TM Ctnt<r (or EcoMmic For<C4Stl"8
and Alwlysis is a state agency. Con·
trcu:ll or the purchase of services dots not
require competitive bidding (or State and
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